A couple of months ago I made the following proposal:
In brief they were:
- normalize SURF gNSBT swap power
- disable NSBT gNSBT swap power (yes, this swap power be set zero)
- USDN->uSURF swap must be 1:1 (uSURF is like SURF but for USDN->SURF swaps only, and with a different liquidation mechanism)
- Allow to convert vires vested USDN to uSURF, allow uSURF to be used as collateral in vires.
I want to insist in the importance of them in order to provide attractiveness to SURF, but with some modifications. The item 4 is already more or less present in vires, as now vested USDN can be finally converted to SURF. I also suggested the possibility to allow to use SURF as collateral in vires, but with the addition that has to be with a collateral value of market price, not SC one.
The item 3 could be modified. Probably not need a separated liquidation mechanism for SURF issued via USDN, but still the 1:1 is required in order to avoid future inflation, to speed up SURF liquidation, and to make issuing of SURF via WAVES more relevant, which is needed for increasing collateral so SURF starts to work as recapitalization bond, which was the original purpose. 1:1 USDN->SURF swap is still needed for the protection mechanism and vires vesting USDN conversion to SURF.
One may argue that at rate 1:1 it is not attractive enough to convert vested USDN to SURF. And the separated liquidation mechanism (uSURF) I made in the previous version of the proposal intended to cover that. However, we must also notice that success of vested USDN and success of SURF are absolutely tied. If SURF has no success, also USDN won’t. And if SURF has success, also USDN will. So, choosing between SURF conversion or conservation of vesting USDN does not present any difference in risk. The difference between them resides in benefits: SURF provides swap power, arb benefits and fees rewards. Vesting USDN will provide now the native stake rewards.
Of course, right now the swap power and fees rewards of SURF gNSBT are poor, and that affects severely its attractiveness. That is why it is very important to insists in items 1and 2, which are widely explained on the previous version of the proposal, so I will not repeat here. What must be understood is that, if NSBT holders want to start again to get sustantial benefits in the long term, we will have to sacrifice current short term benefits for a time. Otherwise SURF will not work, BR will be very difficult to be recovered, and if USDN fails, NSBT will not get benefits anymore. So in summary, these are the first points of the revised version of the proposal:
- normalize SURF gNSBT swap power
- disable NSBT gNSBT swap power (yes, this swap power be set zero)
- USDN->SURF swap must be 1:1
- Allow SURF to be used as collateral in vires at market price.
In addition, and in order to freely allow governance power to SURF stakers to grow (more attractiveness) without affecting NSBT stakers governance power, I want to add a new item:
- To have a “bicameral” voting instance, so SURF stakers vote in a first instance, and NSBT stakers in a second, separated, instance. In order a proposal to pass, it has to pass both voting instances. In this way, no matter the voting power of SURF stakers, NSBT holders will never loose capacity to stop a proposal, which is the biggest concern. Of course, this will make proposals more difficult to pass, as now has to pass two votings. However, good proposals will be passed by both. And this feature adds checks and balances to governance.
I would also add an item 6, more aggressive in case the previous ones are not enough to make SURF attractive:
- All fees rewards from neutrino swaps go to SURF stakers.
Remember that, once BR goes over 1, items 2 and 6 loose effect. So this transfer is temporal and only to help SURF to be more demanded when more is needed.